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This paper reviews Institutions Offering Islamic Financial Services (IIFS) corporate 
governance (CG) challenges and suggests options to address them. It first points out the 
importance of CG for IIFS, where it would require a distinct treatment from convention 
CG and highlights three cases of distress of IIFS.  It then dwells on prevailing CG 
arrangements addressing IIFS’ needs to ensure the consistency of their operations with 
Islamic finance principles and the protection of the financial interests of a stakeholders’ 
category, namely depositors holding unrestricted investment accounts. It raises the issues 
of independence, confidentiality, competence, consistency and disclosure that may bear 
on pronouncements of consistency with Islamic finance principles. It also discusses the 
agency problem of depositors holding unrestricted investment accounts. The paper argues 
for a governance framework that combines internal and external arrangements and relies 
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  Good governance is crucial to the ability of a business to protect the interests of 
its stakeholders. These interests may extend beyond the purely financial to the 
stakeholders’ ethical, religious, or other values. In the case of an institution offering 
Islamic financial services, stakeholders expect its operations to be carried out in 
compliance with the principles of Shariah  (Islamic Law). A corporate structure that 
enables such an institution to implement good governance through Shariah-compliant 
operations is therefore essential.
2 
 
Islamic finance helped sustain economic growth throughout the Muslim world 
during the Middle Ages. After a long period of lull, the last three decades witnessed its 
revival, notably after the first oil price shock of 1973-74. Beyond the surge in liquidity, 
its reemergence was prompted by the introduction of innovative Islamic financial 
products and a demand by Muslim populations for financial services compatible with 
their religious beliefs. More recently, the industry has received a new impetus that can be 
ascribed to a number of factors: the uneven performance of Western financial markets, a 
perception of increased risk for Gulf Cooperation Council capital in traditional financial 
markets, a renewed surge in oil prices, an expressed demand from Muslim communities 
in Western countries, and the development of managerial skills necessary for providing 
Islamic financial services.
3  The global Islamic financial services industry now includes 
284 institutions offering Islamic financial services (IIFS) operating in 38 countries, both 
Muslim and non-Muslim.
4   
                                                 
1 The authors would like to thank Arun Adarkar, Stijn Claessens, Dahlia El-Hawary, Zamir Iqbal, Luigi 
Passamonti, Leila Triki, and participants to meetings of the Islamic Financial Services Board and the 
Accounting and Auditing Organization for Islamic Financial Services for helpful comments on the issues 
discussed.  All remaining errors are the authors’. 
2 Annex I provides a glossary of Arabic terms. 
3 According to the General Council of Islamic Banks and Financial Institutions (CIBAFI), total assets have 
roughly doubled in the period 1998-2001, soaring from $134 to $261 Billion. Source: 
http://www.islamicfi.com (last visited April 04, 2005). 
4 IIFS refers to a firm offering Islamic financial services, and includes finance houses, that offer retail 





Initially, IIFS developed without being clear about the legislative and regulatory 
framework that applied to them.
5 However, their conceptual foundations and operational 
practices have specific features that pose challenges to regulators and call for solutions 
beyond the simple extension of existing legislation and regulation applying to institutions 
offering conventional financial services (ICFS). Consequently, a number of countries 
have established laws and regulations for IIFS, and international bodies have been 
created to adapt conventional standards and harmonize practices.
6  
 
This paper reviews IIFS’ corporate governance (CG) challenges and suggests 
options to address them. Four main concerns motivate this attention to the CG of  IIFS: 
(i) CG is important for economic development; (ii) the assets of IIFS are significant and 
growing, (iii) sound CG may be more critical for financial than other organizations, and 
(iv) the CG vulnerabilities of IIFS may not have received adequate attention in 
conventional CG frameworks.
7   
 
The activities of IIFS impact the welfare of more than 20% of the world’s 
population, mostly in developing countries.
8 In certain financial systems, IIFS may 
channel more than 20% of financial flows. Moreover, IIFS provide access to financial 
services to social groups that would otherwise hesitate to use them.  For both ICFS and 
IIFS, sound CG creates an enabling environment, which rewards banking efficiency, 
mitigates financial risks, and increases systemic stability.  
                                                                                                                                                 
Islamic capital markets, mutual funds and insurance services are also developing, but are not covered here 
These figures were reported in a press release by CIBAFI dated May 8, 2005, (“CIBAFI Raises the Glance 
toward IIFS Growth with a Unique Statistic-Based 10-Year Strategic Plan”).   
5 For example, in some cases the general prudential regime was extended to IIFS without recognizing any 
specific feature.  In other cases, IIFS registered as non-bank commercial businesses. For an introduction to 
the principles and instruments of Islamic finance as well as regulatory arrangements applying to IIFS, refer 
for instance to El-Hawary, Grais, and Iqbal (2004). 
6 These include the Islamic Financial Services Board (IFSB), the Accounting and Auditing Organization for 
Islamic Financial Institutions (AAOIFI), the International Islamic Rating Agency (IIRA), the International 
Islamic Financial Market (IIFM) and the Liquidity Management Center (LMC). Rather than seeking to 
replace existing regulation, these bodies propose solutions whenever conventional regulation fails to 
address the distinctiveness of the Islamic financial industry. 
7 CG is here understood as a set of systems and processes for ensuring proper accountability, probity and 
transparency in the conduct of an organization’s business as well as in the relationships between different 
stakeholders. The definition of CG will be expanded in Section III. 





In a review of the impact of corporate governance on economic development, 
Claessens (2003) identifies four areas in which empirical evidence points to the positive 
effects of good CG on the performance of firms. First, it facilitates access to external 
finance. Lenders and other investors are more likely to extend financing to a business if 
they are comfortable with its CG arrangements, including the clarity and enforceability of 
creditor rights.  Second, good CG tends to lower the cost of capital, by conveying a sense 
of reduced risk that translates into shareholders’ readiness to accept lower returns.  Third, 
good CG is proven to lead to better operational performance. Finally, it reduces the risks 
of contagion from financial distress. In addition to reducing the internal risk through 
raising investors’ risk perception and willingness to invest, it increases the robustness and 
resilience of firms to external shocks. 
 
The second motivation, namely, the importance of CG arrangements for financial 
institutions, arises out of the fiduciary nature of their activities and the likely asymmetry 
in access to information.
9 In essence, a financial institution is a fiduciary trustee, which is 
entrusted with the assets of investors. It is therefore obliged to act in their best interests 
when holding, investing, or otherwise handling their property
10. This is crucial in banking 
institutions, where the scope for informational asymmetries is likely to be greater than in 
other firms. It is difficult for an outsider to control or evaluate bank managers, given the 
latter’s ability to influence boards, alter the risk composition of assets, or hide 
information on loan quality.
11 The opacity of the banking system inevitably reduces the 
effectiveness of a competitive environment by itself to ensure good CG, as takeovers can 
rarely take place when insiders have an informational advantage.
 12   
                                                 
9 Dewatripont and Tirole (1993) argue on the contrary that financial firms present no specific externality 
that differentiates them from other firms and that would justify the need for stricter regulation of financial 
institutions. 
10 In some countries, the fiduciary nature of banking is enshrined in law. For instance, the General banking 
Law of the Philippines states that the “fiduciary nature of banking requires high standards of integrity and 
performance” (Republic Act No. 8791). Also refer to Macey and O’Hara (2003) for an explanation of why 
fiduciary duties of directors should be extended to stakeholders other than shareholders in the case of 
financial firms. 
11 Caprio and Levine (2002), Morgan (2002). 
12 In general, the disciplining power of competition is hindered in banking by limited product market 





Nevertheless, some Islamic scholars argue that IIFS should be immune to these 
flaws. They contend that IIFS have better CG because the moral code of Islam induces 
stakeholders to behave ethically.
13 Nevertheless, the commitment of concerned 
stakeholders to Islamic religious principles cannot be taken for granted. The Nobel 
Laureate Albert O. Hirschman contended that “under any economic, social, or political 
system, individuals, business firms, and organizations in general are subject to lapses 
from efficient, rational, law-abiding, virtuous, or otherwise functional behavior”.
14 
Islamic financial institutions are no exception.
 Indeed, IIFS are no less prone to suffer 
from breaches of fiduciary responsibilities or the consequences of asymmetric 
information. The history of Islamic finance shows that cases of CG failures have features 
in common with conventional banking scandals, such as collusion of the board with 
management, external and internal audit failure, neglect of minority shareholders’ 
interests, imprudent lending, and excessive risk taking by management.
 15  
  
The third motivation of this paper is that the practices of IIFS raise specific CG 
challenges. While a number of problems are common to all financial institutions, and can 
be mitigated by existing regulations, two broad sets of CG issues are specific to IIFS.
 16 
The first arises from the need to reassure stakeholders that the institution’s activities fully 
comply with the precepts of Islamic jurisprudence.
17  Ultimately, the core mission of an 
Islamic financial institution is to meet its stakeholders’ desire to conduct their financial 
business according to Shariah principles.
18  There must, therefore, be CG mechanisms to 
assure them that the necessary safeguards are in place. The same stakeholders also need 
to be assured that the firm will nonetheless actively promote their financial interests, and 
                                                                                                                                                 
competitive, capital markets would still ill-function due to waves of irrational optimism and pessimism that 
result in shareholders looking at immediate revenues rather than the long-term ability of firms to pay 
dividends. For more see Levine (2004) and Prowse (1998). 
13 Sarker (1999). 
14 Hirschman (1970). 
15 For some examples of IIFS CG failures, refer to section II. 
16 We refer to OECD Principles of CG and BCBS Standards for Enhancing CG for Banking Organizations. 
This presents the additional advantage of favoring the integration of IIFSs into global markets. This 
position is also supported by international standard setters like the IFSB and AAOIFI.  
17 Islamic jurisprudence is also known as Fiqh. It covers all aspects of life: religious, political, social and 
economic. It is mainly based on interpretations of the Quran and Sunna (sayings and deeds of the prophet). 




prove to be an efficient, stable, and trustworthy provider of financial services. In practice, 
depositors and borrowers need to feel confident that the types of liabilities and assets that 
IIFS deal with are competitive and offer a risk-return trade-off acceptable to their clients. 
This combination of requirements of Shariah compliance and business performance 




The following section begins with a review of three cases of IIFS distress. They 
illustrate issues specific to IIFS, such as failure to comply with the Shariah, capture of 
the institution by special interests, and weak public policy. Section II considers IIFS’ 
emphasis on stakeholders’ value and the relevance to such institutions of CG 
arrangements based on shareholder value. Section III identifies shortcomings in 
prevailing CG arrangements in protecting stakeholders’ ethical interests in IIFS and 
offers suggestions to address vulnerabilities. Section IV reviews stakeholders’ financial 
interests and arrangements to protect them. Section V presents the conclusions of the 
paper.  
 
I.  Three Cases of Distress 
 
Three cases illustrate possible CG weaknesses in IIFS.
20  The first relates to the 
failure to ensure compliance with stakeholders’ religious beliefs. The other two cases 
show how poor CG structures, both internal and external, can affect investors’ finances, 
particularly those of the relatively unprotected unrestricted investment account (UIA) 
holders, as well as the stability and sustainability of the Islamic financial industry.  
 
A central feature of the CG of an Islamic financial institution is ensuring Shariah 
compliance. To reassure stakeholders, the institution generally sets up a Shariah 
                                                 
19 This paper focuses on those financial issues specific to IIFS, such as the existence of investment 
accounts, profit-smoothing instruments and poor ring-fencing of funds provided by different stakeholders. 
20 Other notable examples, not mentioned in this chapter, include the Kuwait Finance House engulfment in 
the Souk al Manakh crash (1986-87); the liquidation of the International Islamic Bank of Denmark due to 
excessive financing exposure to a single client (1986); and the failure of the Islamic Money Management 




supervisory board (SSB) or retains the services of Shariah advisors that certify the 
Shariah compliance of the financial transactions. However, the ability of the SSB or the 
Shariah advisors to fulfill the mandate may be constrained by the volume of activity, 
their access to monitoring systems, the complexity of financial transactions, or the extent 
of their independence.
21 These factors may have been at play during the collapse of the 
Bank of Credit and Commerce International (BCCI), which involved several IIFS. Five 
IIFS deposited significant resources with the BCCI, a leading CFS business, with the 
understanding that they would be invested in commodity contracts, in compliance with 
Shariah principles.
22 However, following the failure, Price Waterhouse, BCCI’s auditor, 
reported that “there is no evidence to suggest that the bank actually entered into any 
commodity contracts”.
23 The discovery was important, given the level of exposure of the 
concerned IIFS in the BCCI. Reportedly, one of the IIFS involved had 25% of its assets 
placed with the BCCI.
24 The size of exposure suggests a weak due diligence process in 
the verification of Shariah compliance. More generally, the case illustrates the limits a 
SSB may face in discharging its mission.  
 
The 2001 collapse of Ihlas Finance House (IFH) of Turkey illustrates the 
consequences of capture by special interests in an environment of weak internal and 
external checks.  The largest of the Turkish IIFS, with over 40% of the sector deposits, 
IFH was liquidated by the Turkish Banking Regulation and Supervision Agency because 
it had illegally appropriated almost $1billion, virtually the entire value of the deposit 
base, through connected lending to shareholders, concealed by the rapid growth of 
deposits. Concentrated ownership and control had permitted an incentive system biased 
in favor of shareholders. When the bank was liquidated, the misappropriation of funds 
was so large that the bank was unable to pay back its 200,000 depositors.
25 
 
                                                 
21 Section IV expands on the challenges of Shariah CG. 
22 The IIFS in question were the Faisal Islamic Bank of Egypt, the Dubai Islamic Bank, the Khartoum-
based Tadamon Islamic Bank, the Qatar Islamic Bank and Kuwait Finance House, as reported by The Asian 
Wall Street Journal: “BCCI Creditors Granted More Time” (April 9, 1992). 
23 As reported in the Washington Post: “Exposing BCCI Faults: Audit, Testimony Show Disregard for 
Rules” (August 12, 1991).  
24 Financial Times: “BCCI Shutdown. Response Muted from Islamic Institutions” (August 8, 1991) 




IFH, like other Turkish Special Finance Houses, was not covered by deposit 
insurance.
26 The failure created panic among UIA holders that threatened to bring down 
other IIFS in the country. In spite of the reported sound fundamentals of the sector, and 
assurances by Turkish regulators as well as the Association of Special Finance Houses on 
the good health of the system, runs eroded 63% of total deposits in IIFS within the first 
quarter of 2001.
27  Compounding the IFH failure was the inability of IIFS to manage 
liquidity in the absence of Shariah-compliant secondary markets. Overall, the failure of 
IFH revealed the contagion risks to the financial stability and reputation of other IIFS 
because of poor CG. 
 
The 2003 failure of the Patni Cooperative Credit Society of Surat in India 
provides an example of how weakness in the external institutional environment can affect 
the governance of IIFS. External CG, includes the legal, regulatory and conflict 
resolution framework. As an example, the Reserve Bank of India Act, by requiring that 
deposit-taking institutions maintain interest-bearing accounts with the central bank, 
effectively prevents the functioning of IIFS as deposit taking businesses.
28 Most IIFS 
have chosen the organization form of a cooperative and, as such, face two sets of 
conditions that magnify the challenges of their operations. Firstly, they can operate only 
in the state in which they are licensed, as prescribed by the Cooperative Societies Act.
29 
Secondly, they have to observe conventional prudential standards on capital adequacy, 
income recognition, and asset classification and provisioning, all of which extend to 
financial cooperatives. The cumulative effect of these conditions complicates the intrinsic 
challenge of liquidity management for IIFS, given their exclusion from conventional 
money markets. They also limit the potential scale of the firms’ activities and affect their 
                                                 
26 IIFS investment deposits cannot in principle be insured because this would insulate UIA holders from 
credit and market risks, thus violating the risk-sharing nature of investments, prescribed by Fiqh jurists.  
27 Starr and Yilmaz (2004). 
28 To acquire bank status, Indian IIFS would be required to maintain a deposit account with the central 
bank, on which they would earn interest. A strict interpretation of this rule forces them to opt for the status 
of non-banking financing company to preserve their Islamic (interest-free) nature. For more, refer to Khan 
(2001). Regulations applying to IIFS in India are currently under review. 





30 The management of the Patni Cooperative may therefore have 
been induced to take excessive risks, resulting in an unsustainable level of non-
performing loans.
31 
II. Shareholders’ versus Stakeholders’ Value: Corporate 
Governance in Islamic and Conventional Financial Institutions  
 
Widely publicized mismanagement scandals have focused attention on the 
relevance of CG for the protection of the rights of shareholders’ as well as of other 
stakeholders.
32 Misconduct in financial businesses not only creates widespread 
investment losses, but also shakes investors’ confidence, and raises doubts about the 
stability of the international financial system. Equally important, they damage the value 
of all other stakeholders, such as creditors, suppliers, consumers, employees, and 
pensioners, and of communities at large. They affect the livelihoods of the victims of the 
businesses’ financial distress.
33 The consequences of weak CG in a financial institution 
are, therefore, not only financial, but also entail heavy costs in social and human terms. In 
contrast, sound CG facilitates access to external finance, improves the firms’ operational 
performance, enhances systemic financial stability, and contributes to the welfare of the 
community.    
 
Over time, growing concerns about the impact of business performance on groups 
other than shareholders have led to measures to protect stakeholders being superposed on 
what continues to be essentially a shareholder value based framework. Conventional CG 
does not yet offer an analytical framework to internalize stakeholders’ protection within 
the objectives of the firm. It adopts a pragmatic approach that offers rules that may not 
                                                 
30 Ramesha (2003). There is also a different school of thought that maintains that prudential standards 
conceived for shareholding financial companies can be applied to financial cooperatives with no negative 
impact on the performance of the latter. 
31 For more refer to Bagsiraj (2002). As of the final drafting of this paper, no decision has yet been taken on 
the liquidation by Patni bank by the Reserve Bank of India.  
32 At the end of 2004, the insurance industry was the target of accusations by Eliot Spitzer, New York’s 
Attorney General, for price-fixing, bid-rigging and undisclosed payments.  See  The Economist 
“Reprehensible - The Insurance Industry” (October 23, 2004). 
33 These would be stakeholders with a contractual relationship with the firm.  The notion of stakeholder 
could be extended to parties who do not have a contractual relationship with the firm and who would be 
affected by the externalities of its decisions.  For example, communities downstream of a new dam project 




necessarily be consistent with the incentives driving whoever controls the business. The 
conceptual difficulty of conventional CG in fully integrating the interests of non-
shareholding stakeholders diminishes its ability to design incentives that can be adapted 
to IIFS.  Indeed, the latter have always assigned a much higher priority than CFS firms to 
non-financial interests as well as given more weight to the interests of non-shareholding 
stakeholders.  
 
The cornerstone of CG arrangements for conventional businesses is the protection 
of shareholders’ rights. From this perspective, the question is how to secure the rights of 
ownership once the investors’ financial resources have been relinquished. The answer to 
this question may lie in the configuration of incentives for managers, control retention by 
owners, and the reliability of the legal system.
34 Shleifer and Vishny (1996) argue that 
“corporate governance deals with the agency problem: the separation of management and 
finance”. They then point out that “the fundamental question of corporate governance is 
how to assure financiers that they get a return on their financial investment”.  While the 
reference to finance and financiers may also include creditors, the primary focus of their 
review is on shareholders’ protection. Indeed the distinction of management and finance 
is targeted at the separation of ownership and control.
  Thus, the major feature of 
shareholders’ value based CG is the design of incentives that lead managers to pursue the 
maximization of shareholders’ value. 
 
  Conventional CG does not overlook stakeholders other than shareholders. Shleifer 
and Vishny (1997) acknowledge the impact of corporate decisions on multiple 
stakeholders. Such awareness is generally either based on agnostic empirical observations 
or social responsibility considerations. For example, Tirole (1999) holds that “managerial 
decisions do impact investors, but they also exert externalities on a number of natural 
stakeholders who have an innate relationship with the firm”. He follows up by asking 
“why (one) should ignore the natural stakeholders and favor the investors, who are 
                                                 
34 The choice of the distribution and use of owners’ control may be affected by the extent to which 
ownership is atomistic or concentrated. However, while the protection of minority shareholders’ rights 





“stakeholders by design”, by giving them full control rights and by aligning managerial 
compensation with their interests”.  
 
Trying to internalize, through incentives, stakeholders’ value in the decision-
making process of corporations is a daunting challenge. Tirole (1999) examines whether 
the managerial incentives and control structure in a shareholder value framework can be 
adapted to include other stakeholders’ interests. Managerial incentives are difficult to 
design if the firm’s objective shifts from the maximization of shareholders’ value to that 
of the “aggregate welfare of the stakeholders”. The latter has no clear widely accepted 
measure or market value. Accordingly, it does not provide a foundation for linking 
incentives with performance. Falling back on a profit-based compensation system is 
likely to lead to biased decisions, as managers would pursue profitability at the expense 
of other objectives. Sharing control among stakeholders with heterogeneous interests in a 
joint venture would seriously impede its efficacy.
35 Similarly, relying on enlarging 
management’s fiduciary duty to various stakeholders may leave it with too much power 
to pursue its own objectives.
36 Thus, trying to design managerial incentives to 
accommodate stakeholders’ interests is more complex than might at first appear.    
 
Public policy overcomes the limitations of available analytical frameworks to deal 
with stakeholders’ value by adopting pragmatic approaches. The outcome is 
arrangements that generally strengthen transparency and limit blatant misconduct. 
Standards have emerged and principles have been codified, with significant contributions 
notably by the OECD and the BCBS. The OECD defines CG as “a set of relationships 
between a company’s management, its board, its shareholders and other stakeholders. 
Corporate Governance also provides the structure through which the objectives of the 
company are set, and the means of attaining those objectives and monitoring performance 
are determined”.
37 This definition provides important attributes of CG and emphasizes 
transparency. However, it does not directly deal with the intrinsic issue of the business 
                                                 
35 Hansmann (1996) quoted in Tirole (1999). However some may consider this a much lesser evil than the 
outcome of decisions emanating from undivided control by shareholders.  
36 “Management can almost always rationalize any action by invoking its impact on the welfare of some 
stakeholder”. See Tirole (1999). 




objectives that should guide the distribution of rights and responsibilities within the 
corporation. Indeed, the objectives of a corporation’s founders’, whether these be the 
increase of shareholders’ value or the pursuit of stakeholders’ interest, can be expected to 
affect such a distribution and shape the institutional structure and systems. In particular, 
the distribution of rights and responsibilities among shareholders and other stakeholders 
would be driven by the interests of whoever establishes the corporation and subsequently 
controls it.  
 
Stakeholders’ value is central to the IIFS, and is generally incorporated in mission 
statements (Annex II).
38 A selection of mission statements suggests that IIFS focus on 
two broad sets of objectives: (a) compliance with Shariah principles, and (b) provision of 
excellent services.  Shariah compliance appears to fall into three categories.  The first one 
and most widely understood includes the conduct of financial business in accordance 
with the prohibition of Riba’ and Gharar.
39 The second appears to cover the furthering of 
Islam’s social objectives, in particular the promotion of social benevolence.
40  In this 
regard, the Central Bank of Jordan states in its Banking Law that one of the objectives of 
Islamic banking is the provision of “services aimed at reviving social solidarity organized 
on the basis of mutual benefit”.
41 The third aspect of Shariah compliance is the 
development and promotion of an integrated Islamic financial system, or the “eventual 
institution of an elaborate and comprehensive banking system based on the rules of 
Islamic Shariah”.
42 Subsumed under the set of Shariah objectives of providing excellent 
services are: (a) service to the community as a whole, referring primarily but not 
exclusively to the Muslim community (Ummah); (b) promoting the interests of related 
                                                 
38 Annex II compares the mission statements of 22 leading IIFS and ICFS. 
39 Compliance with Shariah principles appears explicitly in almost all IIFS mission statements. The explicit 
reference to Riba’ or Gharar is less frequent.  Riba’ is mentioned in the mission statement of Dubai Islamic 
Bank. Islamic Bank of Thailand mentions “not being tied with interest”.  
40 The social nature of Islamic finance emerges most clearly in the practices of Zakat and Qard Hassan. 
Zakat is a tax on wealth while Qard Hassan are zero-return beneficence loans to be made to the needy. See 
for example the goals of ABC Islamic Bank (E.C.) and Dubai Islamic Bank. Badr-Forte Bank of Russia 
mentions “social justice and harmony”. Meezan Bank limited of Pakistan refers to the “implementation of 
an equitable economic system, providing a strong foundation for establishing a fair and just society for 
mankind”. 
41 Article 50a of the Banking Law of Jordan, Law No. 28 of 2000, as amended by Temporary Law No.46 of 
2003. Available at www.cbj.gov.jo/  
42 See the mission statements of Badr-Forte Bank of Russia, Al Baraka Islamic Bank (Bahrain), and Faisal 




parties, including shareholders, depositors, and employees; and (c) the developing the 
professional and ethical qualities of management and staff.
 43 
 
IIFS’ CG arrangements are mostly modeled along those of the conventional 
shareholder corporation, in spite of the explicit mandate to promote social welfare and 
pursue stakeholders’ value. This configuration leads to a distribution of rights and 
responsibilities that essentially leaves control with shareholders. The most notable 
variation in CG structure is the presence of a Shariah board of scholars and a Shariah 
review unit that ensure compliance with the Islamic law. Shariah compliance decisions 
affect all IIFS stakeholders. In addition, internal stakeholders such as investment account 
holders, and external governance structures such as accounting would perhaps be 
distinctive features of an Islamic financial institution Nevertheless, IIFS’ CG practices 






                                                 
43 This is referred to as “maximizing our clients and shareholders value” (Al Baraka Islamic Bank), 
“achieve optimum and not maximum profits, for the mutual benefit of customers and the bank” (Dubai 
Islamic Bank), “constantly strive to protect (its) shareholders’ interest” (Bank Islam Malaysia Berhad), or 
“optimizing the stakeholders’ value” (Meezan Bank limited Pakistan). 
44 IIFS operate mostly in jurisdictions where legal protection could be strengthened.  The prohibition of 
Riba’ and Gharar translates into risk-sharing arrangements that may leave stakeholders in uncertainty as to 
the security of their assets.  Furthermore undivided control with shareholders can create biased decision-








Since IIFS’ configurations mostly identify shareholders as the residual claimants 
of the institutions, the internalization of stakeholder value may in the short-term require 
solutions that do not necessarily reflect the incentives enshrined in the firm’s governance 
system and processes. However, the identification of IIFS’ mission as the promotion of 
the welfare of all stakeholders should lead to the gradual adaptation of ownership 







                                                 
45 Table I provides a simplified contrast of the issues in shareholder and stakeholder centered perspectives 
























Table I - Shareholder versus Stakeholder Centered CG Issues 
Model  Control  Fiduciary Duty  Firm’s Objective 
Shareholders 
Centered 




Stakeholders have right 
to participate in 
decisions 




With shareholders   -To all stakeholders 
-To board of  Shariah 
scholars 
- Compliance with 
Islamic Shariah 
- Excellence of service to 
all stakeholders 
IIFS Options 
Stakeholders have right 
to participate in 
decisions 
-To all stakeholders 
-To board of  Shariah 
scholars 
- Compliance with 
Islamic Shariah 
- Excellence of service to 
all stakeholders 
Source: Derived from Boatright, J. R. (2002) and extended to include IIFS. 
 
III.  Shariah Compliance and Stakeholders’ Ethical Interests 
 
The Governor of the Bahrain Monetary Agency conveyed the sense of IIFS’ roots 
in stating that “Islamic banks have grown primarily by providing services to a captive 
market, people who will only deal with a financial institution that strictly adheres to 
Islamic principles”.
46 This pledge to conduct activities in accordance with Shariah 
principles entails that IIFS would:  (i) not engage in interest-based debt transactions, (ii) 
not conduct a purely financial transaction disconnected from real economic activity
47, 
(iii) not participate in a transaction where there is exploitation of any party, and (iv) not 
participate in activities regarded as harmful to society. Failure of individual institutions to 
ensure compliance would entail a reputational risk for the Islamic finance industry.
48 To 
mitigate such risk, IIFS have created CG structures and processes that reassure 
                                                 
46 As reported by Middle-East-Online.com on February 17, 2004. http://www.middle-east-
online.com/english/bahrain/?id=8922=8922&format=0 (last visited April 11, 2005) 
47 This concept is sometimes referred to as “materiality”.  
48 In a survey of depositors’ preferences, Chapra and Ahmed (2002) show that 81.7% of surveyed 
depositors in Bahrain would withdraw funds from their Islamic bank and chose an alternative Islamic bank, 
should failure to comply with to Shariah emerge. In the case of Bangladesh, the percentage is 46.6. In 




stakeholders on the Shariah compliance of all transactions. A widely adopted approach is 
to have independent bodies certify such compliance. 
 
Each Islamic financial institution has in-.house religious advisers, collectively 
known as Shariah Supervisory Board (SSB), as part of the internal governance structure 
of the institution.
49  In some countries, authorities have created oversight arrangements, 
such as Shariah boards or Islamic banking departments within supervisory agencies. 
These usually operate in conjunction with private independent market agents familiar 
with Islamic finance.  
 
SSBs’ tasks may vary according to provisions stipulated in the articles of 
association of the institution or by national regulators. Corporate charters would entrust 
SSBs with ex-ante monitoring and the calculation of Zakat. International and national 
regulators often publish guidelines for SSBs, which refer to their general duty to ensure 
Shariah compliance of transactions and, less frequently, provide guidelines on 
competences, composition and decision-making (Table II).
 50  
 
  In principle, SSBs’ prerogatives lie in five main areas: certification of 
permissible financial instruments through fatwas (ex-ante Shariah audit), verification of 
transactions’ compliance with issued fatwas (ex-post Shariah audit), the calculation and 
payment of Zakat, disposal of non-Shariah compliant earnings, and advice on the 
distribution of income or expenses among the bank’s shareholders and investment 
account holders.
51 Each SSB issues a report to certify the Shariah compliance of all 
financial transactions. This report is usually an integral part of the institution’s annual 
report.  
 
                                                 
49 They exist in all Islamic countries with the exception of Iran, where compliance of the whole banking 
system with Shariah is guaranteed and monitored by the central bank. 
50 We here mention only those countries where authorities have implemented laws, acts or issued circulars 
and regulations on internal Shariah Supervisory Boards. Annex III details the legal bases and the 
provisions of these regulations. 
51 A Fatwa is a religious edict or proclamation. It is a legal opinion issued by a qualified Muslim scholar on 
matters of religious belief and practice.For more, see Briston and El-Ashker (1986) and Abdel Karim 





Table II - Regulations on Internal Shariah Advisory** 










SSB Fit and 
Proper 
Criteria 
Bahrain   3  3  unspecified  3  3 
DIFC*  3  3  unspecified  3  3 
Indonesia  3  unspecified unspecified  3  3 
Jordan  3  3  3  3  unspecified 
Kuwait  3  3  3  unspecified unspecified 
Lebanon  3  3  unspecified  3  unspecified 
Malaysia  3  unspecified unspecified  unspecified  3 
Pakistan  3  3  unspecified  3  3 
Philippines  3  3  unspecified unspecified  3 
Thailand  3  3  unspecified  3  3 
U.A.E.  3  3  unspecified  3  unspecified 
∗   Dubai International Financial Centre 
** Annex III details the legal bases and the provisions of these regulations 
Source: Official country websites and central bank Annual Reports 
 
In addition to Shariah boards, most IIFS, particularly those complying with 
AAOIFI standards, have established another internal Shariah review structure, namely, 
Shariah Review units.
52 These units are independent of other departments or are an 
integral part of the Internal Audit and Control Department. The array of tasks that they 
perform is parallel to that of audit departments: reviewers generally use all necessary 
powers to ascertain that all financial transactions implemented by management comply 
with SSB rulings.
53 In some instances Shariah review units have exclusive competence 
                                                 
52 In AAOIFI member countries and banks adhering to the organization, internal Shariah review is 
prescribed by Governance standard 3. In Pakistan, it is regulated by Annexure-III to IBD Circular No. 02 of 
2004. 
53 In this respect, the role of the internal review unit is limited to a complementary ex-post monitoring. This 
makes its task secondary, if more focused and defined, to that of the SSBs, which are the ultimate arbiters 




on ex-post facto monitoring.
54  These units and SSBs face similar challenges, relating, in 
particular, to independence, and competence.  
 
Beyond internal arrangements, the broader Shariah governance framework may 
include features put in place by regulators, as well as the provision of financial 
information services to persons outside the institution. Among regulatory arrangements, 
centralized SSBs are the most noteworthy in relation to Shariah governance. While there 
are significant differences across countries, centralized SSBs are usually concerned with 
ex-ante monitoring, mostly understood as standardization of Shariah interpretation, and 
ex-post monitoring of Shariah compliance. They are also concerned with issues relating 
to upholding Shariah compliance, and offer arbitration and recourse to settle Shariah 
disputes between members of the same SSB.
55 
Table III - External Shariah CG institutions by country* 
Country  Centralized SSB or High Shariah 
Authority or Fatwa Board 
Islamic Rating Agency  
Jordan   No No 
Malaysia   3  3 
Sudan  3  No 
Bahrain   No † No  † 
Kuwait  3  No 
Pakistan  3  No 
UAE  3  No 
Indonesia   3  No 
* Annex IV details the names and powers of these departments/authorities. 
† Bahrain is the seat of the IIFM and the IIRA that respectively set standards for Islamic jurisprudence and rate Islamic instruments on 
an international scale. 
Source: Official country websites and central bank Annual Reports. 
 
                                                 
54 This is the case of large IIFS where the SSBs may not be able to assess large volumes of transactions. 
Therefore, separate Shariah control departments have been established. This seems to be the case in al 
Rajhi Banking and Investment Corporation and Dubai Islamic Bank. 
55 Annex IV presents names and powers of these organizations. It focuses in particular of the powers of  





Private mechanisms for the external monitoring of Shariah compliance are 
limited. In particular, private rating agencies have not yet developed the necessary skills 
or found enough incentives to monitor IIFS’ Shariah compliance. “Islamic rating” has so 
far been the exclusive domain of government-sponsored organizations such as the IIRA 
and the Malaysian Rating Corporation.  Likewise, other external actors with an interest in 
Islamic finance, such as financial media and external auditors, are still generally less 
concerned with assessments of Shariah compliance.
56 
 
The functioning of SSBs raises five main CG issues: independence, 
confidentiality, competence, consistency and disclosure. The first issue concerns the 
independence of the SSB from management. Generally, members of an SSB are 
appointed by the shareholders of the institution, represented by the board of directors to 
which they report. As such, they are employed by the institution, and their remuneration 
is proposed by the management and approved by the board. The SSB members’ dual 
relationship with the financial institution, as providers of remunerated services and as 
assessors of the nature of operations, could create a conflict of interest.   
 
The issue of confidentiality arises from the practice of Shariah scholars often 
sitting on the SSBs of several IIFS, thereby gaining access to proprietary information of 
possibly competing institutions.  
 
The third issue is competence. In performing their function, Shariah scholars are 
expected to be familiar with Islamic law and to have financial expertise. In practice, very 
few scholars are well-versed in both disciplines.   
 
The fourth issue is the consistency of judgment across IIFS, over time or across 
jurisdictions, within the same institution. Such consistency would help to promote the 
customer’s confidence in the industry and the enforceability of contracts. Conflicting 
                                                 
56 A notable exception is the multiplication of Stock Market Islamic Indices whose major contribution is the 





opinions on the admissibility of specific financial instruments or transactions would hurt 
business confidence and market efficiency.
57  
 
Finally, disclosure of all information relating to Shariah advisory functions would 
strengthen the credibility that the offered services are essentially distinct from 
conventional ones and, furthermore, promote market discipline.   
 
A SSB within an IIFS has the advantage of being close to the market. A 
competent and independent SSB, empowered to approve new Shariah conforming 
instruments, would facilitate innovation within the firm. In issuing its fatwas, the SSB 
could be guided by standardized contracts and practices that could be harmonized by an 
international standard-setting self-regulatory professionals’ association. Such an approach 
could ensure consistency of interpretation and enhance the enforceability of contracts 
before civil courts. Review of transactions would mainly be entrusted to internal review 
units, which in collaboration with external auditors, would be responsible for issuing an 
annual opinion on the Shariah compliance of the transactions. This process would be 
sustained by reputable agents, like rating agencies, stock markets, financial media, and 
researchers that would channel signals to market players. Such a framework would also 
enhance public understanding of the requirements of Shariah, and lead to a more 
effective participatory role by the stakeholders in the activities of the institution.  
IV.    Stakeholders’ Financial Interests  
 
Given that the core mission of a financial institution is to enable its stakeholders 
to pursue their financial interests, the CG arrangements for IIFS cannot underestimate the 
importance of having a framework that credibly protects these interests while not 
breaching their values. We focus attention here on three main categories of stakeholders, 
namely, shareholders, depositors, and borrowers.  
 
                                                 
57 A typical example is the financing of leisure activities, which is regarded as haram only by some Fiqh 
scholars. Moreover, Islamic jurisprudence is based on different schools of thought that may vary from 
country to country (the Shiah branch and the Sunni branch, which in turn includes the Madhahib, Shafie, 




The prevailing organizational structure of IIFS is that of a shareholding company. 
Their CG arrangements, therefore, appear similar to those of businesses offering 
conventional financial services, with the conventional focus on agency problems between 
shareholders and management (Figure I).
58 However, they may not have effectively 
incorporated incentives to protect other stakeholders’ financial interests, in particular 
those of unrestricted investment account (UIA) holders.  
 
Generally, IIFS offer three broad categories of deposit accounts: current, 
unrestricted investment, and restricted investment.
59 Each category raises some CG 
issues, but those of unrestricted investment account (UIA) holders may be the most 
challenging. Essentially, it is the asymmetry between the extent of these depositors’ 
participation in bearing investment risks and of their ability to influence the operations of 
the institution.  
 
UIA holders are often the most important category of IIFS depositors. They enter 
into a mudaraba contract with the financial institution to manage their funds.
60  The 
institution places these funds in investment pools, and profits on investments, if any, are 
distributed at maturity according to the profit and loss sharing (PLS) ratio specified in the 
contract. The UIA holders, and not the IIFS, bear the risk of a poor performance of the 
investment pool, except for misconduct on the part of the financial institution.
61 Thus, 
UIA holders are stakeholders akin to shareholders. They are principals entrusting their 
resources to an agent, the financial institution’s management – with the significant 
difference that, in their case, the agent is appointed by another principal, namely, the 
shareholder.  
 
                                                 
58 Concentrated ownership in private IIFS, or state ownership in others point to the need to pay attention to 
the protection of small shareholders and that of state assets respectively.  
59 Most IIFS also offer savings accounts. However, they usually fall in either the category of term 
investments or in that of current accounts. We therefore only distinguish between investment deposits and 
current account deposits. 
60 The case of Wakalah UIAs, which are based on an agency relationship with the IIFS earning a flat fee, 
rather than a share of profits, is not considered here.  
61 This risk-sharing feature has led some to argue that UIA are not liabilities for the IIFS and accordingly 
they should not be required to meet the same capital requirements as ICFS. In particular, the credit and 




The IIFS practice of commingling shareholders’ and depositors’ resources in 
investment pools can raise the possibility of conflict of interest. The management’s 
discretion in the configuration of the pools and in the investments made from them, can 
result in differential treatment of various stakeholders. Moreover, the practice may reduce 
the transparency of IIFS’ compliance with their clients’ investment objectives. 
Accordingly, regulatory authorities may need to prescribe disclosure rules, and possibly   
firewalls and sanctions for breaches. This is of paramount importance to UIA holders, 
whose funds are normally common-pooled with those of shareholders. 
 
IIFS generally create reserve funds to smooth the returns to UIA holders or 
protect their principal in case of adverse developments in the performance of the 
investment portfolio.
62 IIFS consider these funds important to deal with competitive 
pressure from ICFS and other IIFS. While in principle, returns to UIA holders are 
supposed to vary according to IIFS performance, poor returns may induce UIA holders to 
transfer their funds to a better performing institution.  To mitigate such a risk, IIFS set up 
profit equalization reserves and use them in periods of poor performance to complement 
the returns that would be due to UIA holders. The reserves are fed by retaining earnings 
to UIA holders in periods of high returns on investment. Similar arrangements help the 
IIFS protect the principal of UIA holders. A special risk investment reserve is used for 
compensating a loss of principal resulting from poor investment results. The use of profit 
equalization and risk investment funds raises issues pertaining to the governance of these 
funds and the protection of UIA holders’ rights.  In particular, the practice of profit 
equalization may convey an inaccurate view on the actual performance of the financial 
institution, compounding the asymmetry of information available to UIA holders and 
management.  
 
Widely available and affordable financial information can enhance the 
effectiveness of official and private monitoring of financial businesses’ performance. It 
promotes transparency and supports market discipline, two important ingredients of 
                                                 
62 These reserves are generally known as Profit Equalization Reserves (PER) and Investment Risk Reserves 




sound CG to protect stakeholders’ financial interests. Financial information may be 
particularly important for IIFS because of the private equity nature of UIAs and the 
assumption that UIA holders have more at stake than conventional depositors. UIA 
holders could therefore be expected to have a heightened interest in directly monitoring 
the institution’s performance. However, this requires an institutional infrastructure that 
facilitates the production of accurate financial information, the availability of agents that 
can interpret and disseminate it, as well as arrangements to protect its integrity. On all 
these counts, the Islamic financial industry may be facing challenges. The existing 
limited infrastructure reduces the role that information flows can play in promoting 
competition and market activities that would induce managers to adopt sound CG 
practices. 
 
Of particular relevance to the financial information infrastructure is a chart of 
accounts for businesses to organize and produce credible financial statements. To enable 
IIFS to achieve this, the accounting profession has developed standards, at both the 
national and international levels. An increasing number of countries have adopted the 
International Financial Reporting and Accounting Standards (IFRS) in the wake of an 
apparent consensus to promote international convergence. However, these standards are 
designed for conventional businesses, including ICFS.  As for IIFS’ case, their practice of 
setting up reserve funds to smooth profit distribution and protect the UIA holders’ 
principal, and the commitment to distribute Zakat, are among the features that make the 
IFRS not wholly suitable for IIFS. This led to the establishment in the early nineties of 
AAOIFI, which developed standards specific to IIFS.
63 While there has been some 
progress through using  AAOIFI’s standards, the accounting pillar of the financial 
information infrastructure for IIFS continues to present challenges. Wherever IFRS are 
the only rule, they may not generate financial statements correctly reflecting the IIFS’ 
performance, and may instead give a false sense of reliability. Where AAOIFI standards 
                                                 
63 AAOIFI's standards are mandatory for the following markets: Bahrain, Jordan, Sudan, Qatar, and Dubai 
International Financial Center. Syria is considering their adoption.  The standards are used as guidelines in 
Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Malaysia, Lebanon, and Indonesia. Most Islamic banks’ Shariah supervisory 




prevail, they would enable the accounting system to deal adequately with IIFS 
specificities. However, they may make cross-sector comparisons difficult. 
 
Table IV - Country Approaches to Accounting and Auditing Standards for IIFS 
Country   AAOIFI standards (adopted 
adopted/recommended/ adapted) 
or national IIFS specific standards 
Non-IIFS specific standards  
Bahrain  3   
DIFC  3   
Egypt    3 
Indonesia  3   
Jordan   3   
Lebanon  3   
Malaysia  3   
Philippines    3 
Qatar  3   
Saudi Arabia    3*  
Sudan  3   
Syria  3   
Thailand    3 
Turkey     3 
USA    3 
UK    3 
* The Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency recommended IIFS to seek guidance from AAOIFI FAS in 
compiling their statements, but requires IFRS. 
Source: Official country websites and central bank Annual Reports. 
 
The provision of financial information on IIFS continues to be limited. Investors 
and analysts may not be entirely familiar with the nature of IIFS and with AAOIFI 
standards, but the action of market forces has already brought about substantial progress. 
For instance, leading international rating agencies now monitor and rate IIFS and are 
acquainted with AAOIFI prescriptions.
64 They have also tailored their rating mechanisms 
to the risk profile of Islamic banks.
65 However, the absence of a consensus on 
                                                 
64 These are Fitchratings, Capital Intelligence and Moody’s Investors Service. Capital Intelligence was the 
pioneer in rating and analyzing IIFS. It now covers 21 IIFS across 8 countries. 
65 Capital Intelligence uses the same categories to rate IIFS and ICFS, falling namely in 6 areas: regulation 
and supervision, operating environment, franchise strength, management quality, financial fundamentals, 
and external support. However, given the nature of IIFS, the analytical focus is adjusted. For instance, 
liquidity risk management may be more important in rating IIFS than in rating ICFS given the lack of 




internationally accepted and standardized accountancy practices for IIFSs reduces the 
ability to make comparisons across markets, and may reduce consistency in ratings.
66   
 
Overcoming these financial information challenges should promote a competitive 
environment for IIFSs, and thereby enhance the contribution that competition can bring to 
sound IIFS CG.
67    
 
There are three alternative approaches to empowering and protecting UIA 
holders. Rights that normally belong to equity-holders could be extended to UIA holders. 
Or, moving in the opposite direction, UIA holders could be granted full debt-holding 
status and the protection it carries. Alternatively, the sui generis status of UIA holders 
could be maintained, provided that specific governance structures for the protection of 
UIA holders’ interests are in place.  
 
The first option would be the extension of shareholders’ rights and duties to UIA 
holders. Given their equity-like investment, it may be argued that UIA holders should be 
on an equal footing with shareholders and thus be granted the right to have a voice by 
electing board representatives. This measure would increase their ability to air their 
demands and concerns with management. It would also satisfy these depositors’ demand 
for greater involvement in the strategic management of the IIFS.
68 
 
If extending shareholders’ rights to UIA holders is deemed impractical, 
depositors’ protection may be an alternative option. However, the moral hazard argument 
against deposit insurance schemes would need to be addressed. Furthermore, the PLS 
nature of investment accounts prevents the application of deposit insurance in its present 
form, and a Shariah-compliant version would need to be developed.  
 
                                                 
66 For example, as we can see onn table IV, AAOIFI’s standards are not broadly endorsed by regulatory 
agencies. 
67 Grosfeld and Tressel (2001) provide evidence that competition has an important complementary effect 
where good CG mechanisms are already in place. 
68 In a survey of IIFS consumers’ preferences, Chapra and Ahmed (2002) record an interest by depositors to 




The third option would be to create new governance structures that cater to the 
specific needs of UIA holders. One possibility is to elect a special representative or body 
that would act as an intermediary and, if necessary, expose wrongdoings. Such a policy 
would provide the key rationale for the creation of a permanent institutional channel to 
facilitate information flows from and to UIA holders. However, the creation of a new 
agent would bring with it additional agency problems and the risk of multiplying rather 
than diffusing the asymmetries of information to which UIA holders are subject. 
 
Concerns on potential conflicts of interest should lead regulators to emphasize a 
transparent conduct of business. In this regard, smoothing of returns to UIA holders as 
currently practiced appears to be a significant obstacle to transparency. The practice of 
smoothing of returns introduces a veil of opacity between depositors and the firm, 
whereas, in all circumstances, an IIFS should be fully transparent in the use of funds. 
AAOIFI FAS 11 provides clear principles and guidelines on this issue. In particular, it 
requires IIFSs to disclose the shares of the actual profits and of the funds from the profit 
equalization reserve in the returns they receive.
69 In addition, each IIFS needs to adopt 
clear provisions regulating contributions to these funds and their disclosure in financial 
statements and annual reports.
70 
 
Overall, internal and external CG structures can complement each other in 
strengthening stakeholders’ protection.  Internally, the protection of minority 
shareholders and provisions for increased disclosure  need attention, but can be addressed 
by the application of existing rules. The commingling of resources, balancing UIA 
holders’ risks and rights, and the utilization of reserve funds need concrete actions to 
enhance the soundness of the internal CG frameworks of IIFS.  
 
                                                 
69 Some IIFS have already established the practice of distinguishing between profit distribution and the 
amount of reserve distributed. 
70 Decisions pertaining to PER and IIR should ideally be left to the business. However, concerns over 
maintaining the UIA holder principal and the systemic consequences that losses may provoke have led 
some regulators to intervene. For instance, the Banking Law of Jordan as amended in 2003 establishes a 
minimum deduction of 10% on earnings to be invested in an investment risk fund in order to cover losses in 




Externally, recognizing the specificity of IIFS within the broader institutional 
infrastructure, would contribute to greater transparency. Whichever regulatory approach 
is chosen, it can be guided by  two rules of thumb. First, regulators need be flexible and 
to work with IIFS in order to become acquainted with the needs of the industry and be 
able to develop acceptable regulatory frameworks.  Secondly, private self-regulatory 
initiatives can provide channels to market discipline and may be as important in Islamic 
finance as in a conventional financial system.  In jurisdictions where regulations result in 
constraints on Islamic finance, IIFS need to evaluate which licensing status is best suited 
to their need for protecting stakeholders’ interests. Regulatory authorities and market 
participants ought to become well versed in the nature and implication of the rules 
adopted, and thus help to promote market discipline without placing an undue burden on 
the IIFS. The existence of an infrastructure, such as IIFS-adapted accounting and auditing 
standards, that would permit the production of timely and reliable financial information, 




Poor CG can carry heavy financial costs for IIFS’ stakeholders, as it would for 
other corporations. In addition, poor governance in IIFS would undermine their 
credibility as financial businesses offering services in compliance with Shariah. Given 
the fledgling nature of the sector and its ethical foundations, the effects of a CG failure 
could be particularly damaging. While international standards applicable to conventional 
financial businesses can offer useful inspiration for IIFS CG, their simple extension to 
IIFS would not be effective in providing safeguards for IIFS stakeholders. The ongoing 
efforts of national and international bodies to address these issues focus on the existing 
shareholding corporate structure of IIFS. They generally do not address the issue of the 
nature of the corporate structure that would be best adapted to the founding principles of 
Islamic finance, the services it would offer, and the competition it would face. It would 
seem, however, that no single model of corporate governance is likely to prevail, as the 
effectiveness of any framework would depend on the socio-economic context and the 





Confidence in the consistency of business practices with Shariah can emanate 
from a SSB as is currently the case. The financial competence of SSB members and their 
independence would need strengthening. The availability of  Shariah compatible guiding 
principles whose interpretation has broad international acceptability can be helpful. An 
international self-regulatory Shariah financial scholars’ association may help to reconcile 
the requirements for innovations with the need for broad standards. Business confidence 
would be strengthened through credible expectations of enforceability of contracts. Ex-
post verification of Shariah compliance could be handled by internal review units, and 
certified by external auditors and reputational agents. 
 
Protecting the interests of UIA holders has developed into one of the main 
challenges of IIFS CG.  Their status of quasi-shareholders, bearing investment risks but 
not having a voice, has led to a number of arrangements.  They include profit 
equalization reserves, investment risk reserves, special board committees, or special 
supervisory attention.  
 
Shortcomings in current practices may require a combination of solutions. In 
particular, the protection of stakeholders’ financial priorities calls for attention to the 
protection mechanisms for  “weak voice” stakeholders, including minority shareholders, 
the position of UIA holders, transparent use of reserves, disclosure of  policies and 
structures, and the soundness of regulatory and broader institutional controls. 
Strengthened  arrangements that would lead to the emergence of reputational agents that 
can exert market discipline would be most helpful.  The synergies between regulation, 
arrangments at the corporate level and the actions of market reputational agents could 
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Annex I: Glossary of Arabic Terms 
Amana 
(Demand deposits) 
Deposits held at the bank for safekeeping purpose. They are guaranteed in capital value 
and earn no return.  
Fatwa  Legal opinion issued by a qualified scholar on matters of religious belief and practice.  
Fiqh 
(Islamic jurisprudence) 
It refers to Islamic jurisprudence that covers all aspects of life: religious, political, social 
and economic. Fiqh is mainly based on interpretations of the Qur’an and Sunna (sayings 
and deeds of the prophet).  
Fiqh al-Muamalat  Islamic Commercial Jurisprudence. 
Gharar  Literally, : uncertainty, hazard, chance or risk. Technically, sale of a thing which is not 
present at hand; or the sale of a thing whose consequence or outcome is not known; or a 
sale involving risk or hazard in which one does not know whether it will come to be or 
not, such as fish in water or a bird in the air. 
Halal  That which is permissible according to Shariah Law. 
Haram   Unlawful according to the Shariah. It indicates transactions which are not permissible 
under Islamic law. 
Hibah  Literally gift. A gift awarded voluntarily in return for a loan. 
Ju’ala 
(Service charge) 
A party pays another a specified amount of money as a fee for rendering a specific 
service in accordance to the terms of the contract stipulated between the two parties. This 
mode usually applies to transactions such as consultations and professional services, 
fund placements and trust services. 
Kifala  It is a pledge given to a creditor that the debtor will pay the debt, fine, or liability. A third 
party becomes surety for the payment of the debt if unpaid by the person originally 
liable. 
Mudaraba 
(Trustee finance contract) 
Rabb -al- mal (capital’s owner) provides the entire capital needed to finance a project 
while the entrepreneur offers his labor and expertise. Profits are shared between them at 
a certain fixed ratio, whereas financial losses are exclusively borne by rabb-al-mal. The 
liability of the entrepreneur is limited only to his time and effort. 
Murabaha 
(Mark–up financing) 
The seller informs the buyer of his cost of acquiring or producing a specified product. 





The bank enters into an equity partnership agreement with one or more partners to jointly 
finance an investment project. Profits (and losses) are shared strictly in relation to the 
respective capital contributions. 
Qard Hassan 
(Beneficence loans) 
These are zero-return loans that the Qur’an encourages Muslims to make to the needy. 
Banks are allowed to charge borrowers a service fee to cover the administrative expenses 
of handling the loan. The fee should not be related to the loan amount or maturity. 
Quran  Islamic scriptures believed by Muslims to be God's revelation to the Prophet.  
Riba’  Literally, an excess or increase. Technically, an increase, which in a loan transaction or 
in exchange of a commodity, accrues to the owner (lender) without giving an equivalent 
counter value or recompense in return to the other party.  
Shariah 
(Islamic Law) 
The Islamic Law extracted from the Qur’an and Sunna (sayings and deeds of the 
Prophet). 
Sunna  Deeds of the Prophet. 
Takaful  Arabic name for insurance based on Shariah rules. An Islamic Insurance is a collective 
protection scheme. It literally means solidarity. Takaful reflects solidarity and is akin to 
mutual insurance. 
Umma  Community of the faithful within Islam 
Wadiah  A safe custody contract between the depositor (customer) and the custodian (bank). 
Wikala  An Agency contract which may include in its terms a fee for the agent. Same contract 
can also be used to give a power of attorney to someone to represent another’s interests. 
Zakat  Religious tax to be deducted from wealth to be paid to the needy.  







Annex II: Mission statements of IIFS and ICFS 
IIFS  Mission statements, objectives or vision  ICFS  Mission statements, objectives or vision 
Jordan Islamic Bank, 
Jordan 
(The bank’s goals are) commitment to providing banking 
services based on compliance with the rules   and principles of 
the glorious Islamic Shariah in all our activities to serve our 
community as a whole, and commitment to equally serve the 
interests of all related parties including shareholders, 
depositors, and employees. (website) 
Mizuho Financial 
Group, Japan 
(Our) (…) basic principles of the consolidation are: 1) offer 
a wide range of the highest quality financial services to our 
customers 2) maximize shareholders’ value and, as the 
leader of Japan’s financial services industry, earn the trust of 
society at large, 3) offer attractive and rewarding job 
opportunities for employees (...) 
Bank Islam Malaysia 
Berhad 
The Corporate Mission of the Bank is to seek to operate as a 
commercial bank functioning on the basis of Islamic 
principles, providing banking facilities and services to 
Muslims and the whole population of this country, with 
viability and capability to sustain itself and grow in the 
process 
 
(The Bank’s) Corporate Objective is to provide its customers 
with Islamic Banking facilities and services of the highest 
possible quality;  to attain viability and sufficient level of 
profitability to sustain growth; to develop and foster a 
competent and innovative management imbibed with high 
standards of integrity and Islamic banking professionalism;  to 
develop a motivated workforce inculcated with appropriate 
work ethics fully committed to the Bank and to offer efficient 
and courteous service to customers; to constantly strive to 
protect its shareholders’ interest; to be always conscious of its 
responsibilities and duties as an Islamic corporate citizen. 
Norges Bank, 
Norway 
The company's primary objective must be to maximize 
shareholders' long-term returns. There must be a clearly 
defined business strategy that is anchored in the board of 
directors. The company must present accurate, adequate and 
timely information concerning its financial position and 
other relevant information. 
 
The company's board of directors shall protect the interests 
of all shareholders and shall be accountable for the decisions 
made by the board. The board of directors shall supervise 
the day-to-day management and company activities, and 
shall ensure a proper organization of these activities, 
including adequate internal control systems. 
Kuwait Finance House, 
Kuwait  
In accordance with the Islamic principles, KFH ensures that 
while working with the public professionally, the company 
guarantees an honorable relationship with its client base and 
the Muslim community as a whole 
Coastal Federal 
Bank, USA 
Our basic corporate objective (is) maximizing the value of 
our shareholders' investment 
Faisal Islamic Bank of 
Egypt 
The ultimate goal being to eventually institute an elaborate 
and comprehensive banking system based on the rules of 




Mission:  We compete to be the leading global provider of 
financial solutions for demanding clients creating 








To build the bank into a modern, dynamic and strong Islamic 
Bank that would play a role in providing a viable alternative 
to the conventional system, that will contribute to the 





The key financial objective of the Bank is to have Total 
Shareholder Return in the top quartile of our Australian 
listed peers over each rolling five year period. 
Badr-Forte bank, 
Russia 
To contribute to the globalization of Islamic Banking as the 
principal institution within the Russian Federation 
implementing Islamic financial and economic concepts, which 




The seven corporate principles are as follows: Focus on the 
customer as the centre of business; creation of shareholder 
value through business activity; teamwork as the engine in 
the creation of value; a management style that generates 
enthusiasm; ethical behavior and personal integrity as a way 
of understanding and conducting business; innovation as the 
engine of progress; and corporate social responsibility as an 
intrinsic part of development. 
AlBaraka Islamic Bank, 
(Bahrain and Pakistan) 
We strive to be a premier regional Islamic bank, dedicated to 
the economic and social development of our target markets, 
maximizing our clients and shareholders value, and focusing 
on the human resource development in an environment of 
creativity and innovation. Albaraka is committed to develop 
and promote an integrated Islamic Financial System. 
Compliance with the rules and principles of Islamic Sharia is 
the core of the banking and financial activities of the Bank. To 
this end, the Bank has successfully sought the advice and 
expertise of Islamic scholars acclaimed for their knowledge 
and piety from all over the Islamic world to guide is path and 
monitor its performance (website) 
BNP Paribas, 
France 
BNP Paribas founds its corporate project on three 
commitments: 1) toward its customers, BNP Paribas 
undertakes to give first priority to their satisfaction and to 
constantly improving the quality of their welcome and of the 
services offered, 2) toward its shareholders, BNP Paribas 
undertakes to put value creation at the very heart of its 
options, 3) toward its employees, BNP Paribas undertakes to 
ensure a dynamic and stimulating management of careers 
and remuneration by developing employee share-ownership 
and promoting social dialogue.  
The respect of these commitments is guaranteed by the team 
spirit of all the bank's employees and their adherence to a 
code of ethics founded on transparency, professionalism and 
quality 
Dubai Islamic Bank, 
UAE 
(The) Objectives of the Bank (are): 1) Providing banking 
services of the highest standards according to Islamic Shariah 
without dealing in riba (interest on money) and by using the-
state-of-the-art technology in computer, telecommunication 
and information system 2) Investing funds prudently to 
achieve optimum and not maximum profits, for the mutual 
benefit of customers and the bank. 3) Coordination, 
cooperation and integration with other financial bodies that 
apply Islamic Shariah in their dealings, in order to support 
creating a base and regulations for an Islamic financial 
system. 3) Development of the Islamic society in all fields of 
the economy by investing in industries, agriculture, 
commerce, and real estate in order provide job opportunities. 
Jyske Bank A/S, 
Denmark 
(…) The Jyske Bank Group is managed and operated as a 
business. At the same time, we attach great importance to 
treating the three groups of stakeholders – shareholders, 
customers and employees – with equal respect. (…) 
 
Our objective is to provide our shareholders with a 
satisfactory long-term return on their investment. Thus, the 
aim is for Jyske Bank every year to be one of the top-
performing Danish banks based on the level of our earnings. 
Jyske Bank is thus an excellent choice for shareholders who 
want to make a long-term investment and who do not attach 
great importance to decisions which generate only short-




4) Promotion of social benevolence through its Islamic 
methods, particularly through Zakat. 5) Contributing to the 
welfare of society in line with the five main tenets of Islam, 
namely protection of life, purity of mind, property, honour and 
social justice. 6) Promoting the savings habit and encouraging 
people to invest wisely within the parameters of Islamic 
Shariah through investment and finance instruments to suit 
individual requirements. 7) Making available the necessary 
capital for entrepreneurs for the establishment of economic 
projects and creation of alternative instruments for finance 
according to Islamic Shariah. 
Islamic Bank of 
Thailand, Thailand 
(The bank’s goals are): to maintain the role of a bank that is 
not tied up with interest; to strengthen the business; to carry 
out social and organizational stability; to provide an excellent 




Mission: To become the most admired Malaysian financial 
services company by providing excellent customer services, 
enhancing shareholder value, providing challenging career 
and learning opportunities for employees, demonstrating 
responsibility for society. 
ABC Islamic Bank 
(E.C.)   
Our mission is to uphold our carefully formulated Islamic 
principles in the quest for mutual prosperity for our clients 
and the Bank.  In pursuit of our mission, we commit the Bank 
to the purest forms of Islamic banking products and services 
from a Shari’a perspective.  We remain demonstrably 
independent from the conventional sector and recognize the 
importance of Islam’s social objectives in conducting 
business. We are committed to delivering a level of service 
that matches, or exceeds, the market practice internationally.  
To do so, we seek to employ the best available human 
resources and the technology to apply the highest 
professional, moral and ethical standards.  
HSBC Canada, 
Canada 
HSBC in Canada is committed to being Canada’s leading 
international financial services organization, a leader in 
chosen markets, and recognized by its clients as proactive, 
responsive, competitive and secure. To achieve a superior 
long term return for our shareholder we will efficiently 
deliver a differentiated client experience which reflects our 
commitment to excellence in sales, service and products, and 
which is delivered by highly motivated and well qualified 
employees, working as a team. Through managing for value, 
HSBC in Canada is committed to making a world of 
difference to its clients, employees, communities and 
shareholders 
Meezan Bank Limited, 
Pakistan 
Establish Islamic banking as banking of first choice to 
facilitate the implementation of an equitable economic system, 
providing a strong foundation for establishing a fair and just 
society for mankind. To be a premier Islamic bank, offering a 
one-stop shop for innovative value added products and 
services to our customers within the bounds of Shariah, while 
optimizing  the stakeholders' value through an organizational 
culture  
 




Barclays aims to be one of the most admired financial 
services organizations in the world; in the eyes of our 
shareholders, our customers, our colleagues and the 
communities in which we work.  
 
The best measure of our long term performance is the total 
return we give to our shareholders - the increase in the price 
of our shares, assuming that any dividends are used to buy  
 




Source: Extracts of corporate mission and goals obtained from websites or annual reports. 
 
Annex III: Legal Basis and Nature of Regulations on Internal SSBs in Selected 
Countries 
Country  Legal base for 
SSB 
SSB competences as 








and Dismissal rules 
Fit and proper 
criteria for SSB 
members 
Bahrain   BMA Rulebook -
Volume 2- Islamic 
Banks - The BMA 
(2005) and all 
AAOIFI standards 
General duty to verify Shariah 
compliance and issue an annual 
report.  Binding advice The 
shareholders shall decide how 
SSB will discharge this duty. 




Unspecified (to be 
decided by 
shareholders) 
Appointed by Shareholders. 
Dismissal is proposed by 
Board and approved by 
shareholders (according to 
AAOIFI standards) 
Conflict of interest and 
competence clauses 
(According to AAOIFI 
governance standards). 
DIFC∗   Law regulating 
Islamic financial 
business, DIFC Law 
No. 13 of 2004 and 
the Islamic Financial 
Business Module of 
the DFSA Rulebook  
Oversees and advises on Shariah 
compliance. Specific duties to be 
established and documented by 
the BIFS.  
No less than 
three 
members. 
Unspecified.  Appointed and dismissed by 
the bank’s governing body 
They must be competent 
(based on previous 
experience and 
qualifications) and are not 
directors or controllers of 
the BIFS 
Indonesia   Act No. 7 of 1992 as 
amended by Act 10 of 
1998, Regulation 
4/1/PBI/2002. 
General obligation to verify 
Shariah compliance (duties as 
stipulated by National Shariah 
Board and established by in 
bank’s articles of association). 
Unspecified. Unspecified.  Any  appointment  or 
replacement of SSB 
members must be reported to 
Bank Indonesia and 
approved by the National 
Shariah Board. 
Documentary evidence on 
SSB members’ previous 
experience to be submitted 
to Bank Indonesia’s Board 
of Governors. 
Jordan   Art. 58 of Law 28 of 
2000 as amended by 
temporary Law 
No.46 of 2003. 
Ex ante audit (fatwas), ex-post 
audit, opinions on Shariah 
matters referred to it. 
No less than 
three 
members. 
By unanimous or 
majority vote. Its 
votes are valid 
only if a majority 
of members is 
present. 
Appointed by the general 
assembly of shareholders. 
Discharged only through a 
reasoned decision taken by 
2/3 of the board of directors 
and endorsed by the general 
assembly. Changes have to 
be notified to the Central 
Bank. 
Unspecified. 
Kuwait  Art 93 of Law No. 32 
of 1968. 
General obligation to verify 
Shariah compliance of banking 
No less than 
three 
By unanimity. In 
case of conflict the 




operations. members.  matter  is  referred 
to the Fatwa 
Board. 
Lebanon  Law No. 575 on 
"Establishing Islamic 
Banks in Lebanon". 
Certification of Shariah 
compliance and proposals for 
properly achieving bank’s 
objectives pursuant to the 
Shariah.   
Three 
members. 
Unspecified.  Appointment for a renewable 
three- year period.  
Unspecified (experts’ 
background must be in 
Islamic law, doctrine and 
banking and financial 
operations). 
Malaysia   Islamic Banking Act 
of 1983 and Central 
Bank of Malaysia Act 
1958 (Revised 1994) 
and Guidelines on 
the Governance of 
Shariah Committees 
(2004) 
Binding advice Shariah on 
compliance of banking operations 
for Islamic Banks. The Central 
Shariah Advisory Council is the 
ultimate arbiter. 
Unspecified.  Unspecified.  Unspecified.  There are several 
incompatibility clauses. 
Pakistan  IBD Circular No. 02 
of 2004. 
General obligation to verify 
Shariah compliance of banking 
operations. The SSB must submit 




board may be 
set up at the 
bank’s 
discretion.  
Unspecified.  Appointment must be 
approved by State Bank of 
Pakistan. 
They are compulsory and 
relate to minimum 
qualification and 
experience, track record, 
solvency, financial 
integrity, honesty and 
reputation and conflicts of 
interests. 
Philippines  Republic Act No. 





Republic Act No. 
6848 
It offers advice and undertakes 
reviews on matters relating to 
Shariah compliance. 
At least three 
but no more 
than five 
members. 
Unspecified.  Unspecified.  SSB members must be 
Islamic scholars and 
jurists of comparative law. 
Thailand  Islamic Bank of 
Thailand Act B.E 
2545. 
It has “the authority and duty to 
give advice and recommendations 
to the Board of Directors 
concerning Islamic principles 
related to the operation of the 
bank”. 
Not more than 
4 members  
At least half of the 
SSB members 
form a quorum and 
decisions are taken 
by majority vote. 
SSB members have a two-
year tenure and may be 
reappointed. They are 
appointed and removed by 
the board of directors. 
Financial integrity, 
competence, honesty and 
conflicts of interests. 
UAE  Federal Law No. 6 of 
1985 
General obligation to verify 
Shariah compliance of banking 
operations. Detailed competences 
No less than 
three 
To be decided in 
the articles of 
association of the 
SSB members must be 






to be established by the bank.  bank 
∗ Dubai International Financial Centre  






Annex IV: External Shariah CG institutions by country  
Country  Separate Islamic 
Banking & Takaful 
Department  at CB 





Separate Islamic Capital 
Market Department within 
Securities regulator 
Bahrain   Yes, Islamic Financial 
Institutions Supervision 
Directorate 
No, but the International Islamic Financial Market is to promote 
the harmonization and convergence of Shariah interpretations in 





Agency operates in 
Bahrain 
No 
Indonesia   Yes, the Directorate of 
Shariah Banking 
Yes, the National Shariah Board is authorized to issue fatwas 
concerning products, services and operations of BIFS. It also 
recommends Shariah advisors to BIFS 
No  
Jordan   No No  No  No 
Kuwait  No The  Fatwa Board in the Ministry of Awqaf and Islamic Affairs is 
the final authority on Shariah disputes. Its advice is binding when 
it arbitrates on disputes between members of the same SSB 
No No 
Malaysia   Yes, Regulation Department 
–Islamic Banking and 
Takaful 
Yes. The Shariah Council advises central bank on Shariah matters 
and is the ultimate arbiter in Shariah interpretation disputes. The 
directives issued by BNM in consultation with the Shariah 






Yes, Malaysian SEC- Islamic Capital 
Market Department. The SEC also has 
its own Shariah Advisory Board 
Sudan  N/A, the whole financial 
regulatory system is Islamic 
Yes, the Shariah High Supervisory Board is responsible for 
fatwas, contract specimen, arbitrage, consultations relating to 
Islamic legal aspects, training, research, lectures, and seminars  
No  N/A, the whole financial regulatory 
system is Islamic 
Pakistan  Yes, Islamic Banking 
Department 
Yes, the Shariah Board of the State Bank is to advise the central 
banks on matters of Shariah. It also produces specimen of 
permissible Islamic Financial contract to ensure compliance with 
minimum Shariah standards  
No  No, but several  departments share 
Islamic finance portfolio 
UAE  No Yes,  the  Higher Shariah Authority, attached to the Ministry of 
Justice and Islamic Affairs, is the final arbiter on Shariah matters. 
It is also responsible of Shariah supervision 






















A  1 1 1  0  0 0 
B  1 0 1  0  0 0 
C  1 0 1  0  0 0 
D  1 0 1  1  0 0 
E  1 0 0  0  0 0 
F  1 0 0  0  1 0 
G  1 0 1  0  0 0 
H  1 1 1  1  0 0 
I  1 1 0  0  0 1 
L  1 1 1  0  0 0 
M  1 1 1  0  0 0 
N  1 1 1  0  0 0 
O  1 0 0  0  0 0 
Effective 
Disclosure   1.00 0.46 0.69  0.15  0.08 0.08 
Desirable 
disclosure   1.00 1.00 1.00  1.00  1.00 1.00 
*The 6 indexes are calculated by attributing a 1 to every item that is disclosed and a 0 to 
items that are not disclosed by the 13 IIFS specified in footnote 54, in information venues 
such as annual reports and websites. The average across IIFS for every item is then taken to 
calculate the effective disclosure index. The desirable disclosure index is 1 assuming that 
ideally every IIFS in the sample ought to disclose information on Shariah Governance 
processes and structures.  
** Two IIFS had never issued a SSB report due to their recent establishment. Nevertheless, 
the items are counted as disclosed due to the IIFS overall high level of disclosure 
SSB composition 
Background of SSB 
 SSB Annual Report*
Fatwas
Decision-making 
















1.00 0.46 0.69 0.15 0.08 0.08
Desirable disclosure  1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
SSB 
compo
sition 
Backgr
ound of 
SSB 
 SSB 
Annual 
Report*
Fatwas
Decisio
n-
making 
duties 
& 
powers 
 
Full 
Disclosure 
No 
Disclosure  
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